... but is it theft?
I find myself engaged in a lively dispute with another blogger, whose intellect I respect, even if I have some reservations about his logic, and deep reservations on his opinions, over a thesis of his.
His thesis runs as follows: The unlawful, involuntary transfer of property from one individual to another is considered theft. Theft is always morally wrong, under all circumstances. Therefore, if the government takes the property of one individual and gives it to another, it is committing theft, which may be legal, but is a priori immoral. However, the taking of property by the government is moral and lawful if it fulfills the proper role of government, defined as the protection of life, liberty and property.
He bases this argument largely on the work of the French economist Frederic Bastiat, specifically his 1850 pamphlet "The Law".
I hold that this is a classic false analogy.
First, the claim that what is wrong in one instance is wrong in all other imaginable instances. This is easily disproven by the example of killing: murder is considered immoral in peacetime, but a moral duty if carried out in wartime. The act remains the same, but if it has the sanction of the state, and the intent of providing for the security of the community, its moral quality is reversed. The other blogger - known as FAR - seems unable to grasp this very simple conclusion.
He would likely argue that the comparison fails because killing in war is intended to achieve one of the core goals of the state as defined in his argument, protection of its members from a threat. This would exonerate killing based on the weight of the intent. However, this does not refute the central assertion I am making, which is simply that the crucial distinction morally and legally is context and intent. If this distinction applies to murder, it needs to apply to what is a lesser crime, theft. Therefore, it is etablished that taking property can be lawful and not theft, and a central element of his thesis is disproved.
The next core premise of his claim is a definition of 'theft' that seems at variance with logic. According to him, theft is essentially the unlawful and involuntary or forced transfer of property from one individual to another individual. Note that this definition has three key components: involuntary, unlawful, and individual. This creates a number of problems. The first is obviously whether a tax, to which every citizen gives sanction by virtue of choosing to be present within American jurisdiction, is involuntary in any meaningful sense; resentment does not exclude grudging consent.
FAR squares this problem by creating a contradiction in terms, "legal theft", loosely based on the proposition that the government has no right to override natural law, which creates and guarantees property. Under this definition, consent does not matter, since the thing to be consented to is a priori immoral and unlawful, which also takes care of his second requirement in defining theft.
However, this puts the onus on FAR to resist this immorality by withholding consent and compliance. If something is always immoral, it must also always be resisted. The fact that such resistance invites sanction is irrelevant under FAR's framework of setting his property at such a high moral level that its maintenance overrides the legal authority of his own government.
He also needs to explain why, even if we use natural instead of constitutional law as the guide, some iterations of the same process - the taking by the government of his money - are acceptable, and others are not, based not on the process, but the subsequent spending.
Obviously, his answer would be that the context and intent of the subsequent spending are the distinguishing factor. Unfortunately, that line of argument again disproves his original claim, that 'theft' as he defines it is always wrong no matter what the context or intent.
The other fallacy is that of presumed individuality in his definition of the crime of theft; in a sense, this is the core of his argument, since his big quibble is that it is immoral for one individual to receive transfer payments at the expense of another.
However, this presupposes a definition of theft in which it can only be comitted by or against individuals, which leaves out non-individual actors such as corporations and public authorities. I don't assume that this is his intent; however, aince his argument rests on this presumption of individuals being involved, it's noteworthy that this creates a huge moral hazard. Once you remove the requirement of individuality, however, you lose the distinction that FAR makes to sustain his underlying fallacy, that some government action is acceptable, exempting only the ones that benefit individuals. This because, again, using the individualistic definition he proposes decriminalizes certain thefts, which would in turn be immoral, and therefore refutes his original moral claim, since what is moral cannot give rise to what is immoral by definition.
FAR likes to claim that I am simply unable to comprehend that the taking of his property by the government is theft. This is wrong; I am fully able to comprehend what he says, but his reasoning and his logic, if closely examined, fall to pieces. That is the crux of this particular matter.
It's an entirely legitimate argument to claim that government should not provide benefits of any kind to anyone. I disagree with it, but that does not make it a less than valid proposition. It is, however, and has been demonstrated above, a logical fallacy to claim that transfer payments are theft, legal or otherwise.
His thesis runs as follows: The unlawful, involuntary transfer of property from one individual to another is considered theft. Theft is always morally wrong, under all circumstances. Therefore, if the government takes the property of one individual and gives it to another, it is committing theft, which may be legal, but is a priori immoral. However, the taking of property by the government is moral and lawful if it fulfills the proper role of government, defined as the protection of life, liberty and property.
He bases this argument largely on the work of the French economist Frederic Bastiat, specifically his 1850 pamphlet "The Law".
I hold that this is a classic false analogy.
First, the claim that what is wrong in one instance is wrong in all other imaginable instances. This is easily disproven by the example of killing: murder is considered immoral in peacetime, but a moral duty if carried out in wartime. The act remains the same, but if it has the sanction of the state, and the intent of providing for the security of the community, its moral quality is reversed. The other blogger - known as FAR - seems unable to grasp this very simple conclusion.
He would likely argue that the comparison fails because killing in war is intended to achieve one of the core goals of the state as defined in his argument, protection of its members from a threat. This would exonerate killing based on the weight of the intent. However, this does not refute the central assertion I am making, which is simply that the crucial distinction morally and legally is context and intent. If this distinction applies to murder, it needs to apply to what is a lesser crime, theft. Therefore, it is etablished that taking property can be lawful and not theft, and a central element of his thesis is disproved.
The next core premise of his claim is a definition of 'theft' that seems at variance with logic. According to him, theft is essentially the unlawful and involuntary or forced transfer of property from one individual to another individual. Note that this definition has three key components: involuntary, unlawful, and individual. This creates a number of problems. The first is obviously whether a tax, to which every citizen gives sanction by virtue of choosing to be present within American jurisdiction, is involuntary in any meaningful sense; resentment does not exclude grudging consent.
FAR squares this problem by creating a contradiction in terms, "legal theft", loosely based on the proposition that the government has no right to override natural law, which creates and guarantees property. Under this definition, consent does not matter, since the thing to be consented to is a priori immoral and unlawful, which also takes care of his second requirement in defining theft.
However, this puts the onus on FAR to resist this immorality by withholding consent and compliance. If something is always immoral, it must also always be resisted. The fact that such resistance invites sanction is irrelevant under FAR's framework of setting his property at such a high moral level that its maintenance overrides the legal authority of his own government.
He also needs to explain why, even if we use natural instead of constitutional law as the guide, some iterations of the same process - the taking by the government of his money - are acceptable, and others are not, based not on the process, but the subsequent spending.
Obviously, his answer would be that the context and intent of the subsequent spending are the distinguishing factor. Unfortunately, that line of argument again disproves his original claim, that 'theft' as he defines it is always wrong no matter what the context or intent.
The other fallacy is that of presumed individuality in his definition of the crime of theft; in a sense, this is the core of his argument, since his big quibble is that it is immoral for one individual to receive transfer payments at the expense of another.
However, this presupposes a definition of theft in which it can only be comitted by or against individuals, which leaves out non-individual actors such as corporations and public authorities. I don't assume that this is his intent; however, aince his argument rests on this presumption of individuals being involved, it's noteworthy that this creates a huge moral hazard. Once you remove the requirement of individuality, however, you lose the distinction that FAR makes to sustain his underlying fallacy, that some government action is acceptable, exempting only the ones that benefit individuals. This because, again, using the individualistic definition he proposes decriminalizes certain thefts, which would in turn be immoral, and therefore refutes his original moral claim, since what is moral cannot give rise to what is immoral by definition.
FAR likes to claim that I am simply unable to comprehend that the taking of his property by the government is theft. This is wrong; I am fully able to comprehend what he says, but his reasoning and his logic, if closely examined, fall to pieces. That is the crux of this particular matter.
It's an entirely legitimate argument to claim that government should not provide benefits of any kind to anyone. I disagree with it, but that does not make it a less than valid proposition. It is, however, and has been demonstrated above, a logical fallacy to claim that transfer payments are theft, legal or otherwise.
posted by Michael at 10:05 AM
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